



STATE OF OREGON

INTEROFFICE MEMO

CONFIDENTIALTO: Governor ~~Gerry Thompson~~ *YUI* *Gerry*

DATE: October 10, 1984

FROM: Bob Oliver *Bob* *10/15*

SUBJECT: Antelope City Charter

OCT 16 1984
Governor Atiyeh

John Stewart enclosed a copy of a 1918 Oregon Supreme Court case. He suggests the Legislature might be able to revoke Antelope's charter because it was incorporated in 1901, and has not been reincorporated since the city-home rule Constitutional amendment of 1906.

Political Issues.

Before discussing legal issues, notice has to be taken of political issues. Even if the Legislature had the power which Stewart believes it might have, action taken against Antelope would have far-reaching consequences. If the Legislature could revoke the charter of Antelope because it was incorporated before 1906, presumably the Legislature would have the same power with respect to all other cities incorporated before 1906. I suspect such a proposition would have the League of Oregon Cities and most of its members ricocheting off every wall in sight.

Enough said about politics.

The 1906 Constitutional Amendment.

We tend to regard the quantity of legislation passed here in Oregon as voluminous. It is almost nothing compared to that in states where every city charter amendment has to be accomplished by legislative Act. Glancing through the bills passed by the Texas Legislature, for example, you may see such measures as one providing for the annexation of 200 acres to the City of Borger; or establishing parking-meter fees for the town of Brownsville; and so forth.

It was perceived in Oregon early in the 1900's that consideration of such measures not only impeded the Legislature's work in dealing with matters of statewide concern, but staked out more ground for wheeling-and-dealing. Consequently, in 1906 the voters approved an amendment to Section 2, Article XI, Oregon Constitution, providing "The Legislative Assembly shall not enact, amend or repeal any charter or Act of incorporation for any municipality, city or town."

Case Law.

Mr. Stewart calls attention to Grants Pass v. Rogue River Public Service Corp., 87 Ore. 637 (1918). The factual situation in that case is straightforward. Grants Pass passed an ordinance giving Corporation power to set up an electrical system for City, requiring a bond of \$1,000. Corporation failed to perform. City moved to forfeit the bond. Corporation took City to court, claiming the city charter did not allow City to require a bond in the first place. The Circuit Court awarded judgment to City, and the Supreme Court affirmed this judgment, upholding City's power. That is the substance and sum total effect of the opinion.

Mr. Stewart highlights a "headnote" on page 638, which seems to say that the Constitutional provisions of 1906 "do not apply to a municipal corporation already chartered." Headnotes to cases are comparable to headlines in newspapers. Just as headlines often are written by people who did not write (or maybe even carefully read) the stories to which they belong, so headnotes usually are not written by judges - often they are written by law clerks. They are intended to give the reader a general idea of what the case is about, and what the court has said. While it is true most headnote writers strive to be accurate, nevertheless only the text of the case itself has legal effect. (Many a first-year law student in practice trial work has been shot down because he put too much faith in headnotes!)

Going on to the text of the case on page 642, Mr. Stewart highlights a paragraph which begins, "Neither is the question before us within the scope or prohibition of the later Constitutional provisions forbidding the Legislative Assembly to enact, amend or repeal any charter or act of incorporation for any municipality, city or town." The court is saying the 1906 amendment is irrelevant to the case before it. The paragraph goes on, "This constitutional measure was not adopted until June 4, 1906, while the privileges conferred by the actual charter of Grants Pass and by the Act of 1893 were all promulgated long before." In other words, Grants Pass could do what it did even without the powers conferred by the 1906 amendment. There is nothing in the whole paragraph which states affirmatively that pre-1906 city charters remain subject to repeal by the Legislative Assembly, as one might infer from reading the headnote.

On the contrary, cases can be found before and after the Grants Pass case which give an extremely broad effect to the 1906 amendment. For example, in Branch v. Albee, 71 Ore. 188 (1914), the Supreme Court held the amendment "expressly prohibits the passage of any law by the Legislative Assembly enacting, amending or repealing any charter of any town or city. The prohibition is absolute. . . . by the said amendment all these powers are

expressly withdrawn." Note that the court does not limit its language to recently incorporated cities - but speaks of "any" town or city. The court goes on to say, "The Constitution does not provide that the Legislative Assembly shall not enact, amend or repeal a city charter by special laws. It declares that said body shall not enact, amend or repeal a charter, and the meaning of this provision is that it shall not do that in any manner. The inhibition is absolute." (The language underscored in this memorandum was emphasized by way of italics in the text of the opinion.)

More recently, the court has dealt with the impact of state laws on city enactments. In City of Portland v. Welch, 154 Ore. 286 (1936), the court recognized the right of the Legislative Assembly to pass laws on matters of statewide concern, even though such laws might affect individual city charters. However, the court warned "The subject matter of the general legislative enactment must pertain to those things of general concern to the people of the state. A law general in form cannot, under the Constitution, deprive cities of the right to legislate purely local affairs germane to the purposes for which the city was incorporated."

Finally, Mr. Stewart encloses a page from Shepherd's Citations, listing two subsequent Oregon cases which cite the Grants Pass case. The first was Wright v. Schutt Construction, 262 Ore. 626 (1972). This case does not discuss constitutional issues at all, but cited the Grants Pass case only to support the proposition that proof of actual damages is not necessary if a city wants to forfeit a contractor's bond. Also cited was Idanha v. Consumer's Power, 8 Ore. App. 558 (1972), which dealt with the question of whether the boundaries of a city must be limited to the description originally found in its charter.

Conclusion.

I believe Mr. Stewart has been misled by an inaccurate case note. The actual text of the Oregon Constitution is all-inclusive in prohibiting the Legislature from repealing city charters. There is no explicit language I can find in any Supreme Court decisions which distinguishes between cities incorporated before or after 1906.

Even if, for the sake of convenience, we wanted to argue that the Legislature retained control over city charters adopted before 1906, I do not see how we could avoid creating political pandemonium in the ranks of all cities (including Antelope), incorporated before 1906.

10/3

Bob O — CONFIDENTIAL
Please review & recommend
Guy

October 1, 1984

1637 Orchard

Eugene, Oregon 97403

683-8657

Governor's Office
Gerry Thompson, Administrative Aide
Salem, Oregon


Dear Gerry,

It was good to talk to you. I was so sorry to hear about your relative. Everybody in the family must be awfully upset. One of their standard recruiting techniques is to use family members on other family members. So, while I'm sure they want to keep contact with her, I would limit that contact to adults if possible and especially be protective of any children as far as custody and the like.

Enclosed is the case I was talking about. Maybe you could show it to Bob Oliver if he hasn't already see it. If the legislature could do this it would be a major blow to their plans. It is especially good public policy because the power of the state is being so abused and misused in the instance of Antelope that it is perfectly responsible for the state to rescind it (if legal). No one would be denied the right to self-government because all would be able to vote in the county election and that would be the governing body. However, the theocracy would not be able to shield itself behind the municipal power.

With the way things are moving so slowly I am afraid this may be Antelope's last chance.

Sincerely,



John Stewart

dered to attend court from outside of Multnomah County should be allowed double mileage at the rate of five cents per mile or ten cents per mile.

The judgment of the lower court as to the taxation of costs will therefore be corrected so as to allow plaintiff for the Clatsop County witnesses ten cents double mileage instead of twenty cents. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED, EXCEPT AS TO COSTS.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE McBRIDE, MR. JUSTICE MOORE and MR. JUSTICE McCAMANT concur.

Argued February 14, affirmed March 5, 1918.

CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. ROGUE RIVER
PUBLIC SERVICE CORP.

(171 Pac. 400.)

Statutes—Repeal—Constitutional Provision.

1. Article IV, Section 20, of the Constitution declares that every act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be embraced in the title, but that if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to that subject. Act Feb. 28, 1913 (Laws 1913, p. 689), is entitled, "An act to provide for the organization and incorporation of cities and towns and to legalize such corporations as heretofore have attempted to be incorporated under Chapter 1 of Title XXVI of Lord's Oregon Laws, and are now exercising the functions of incorporated cities and towns under such attempted incorporation." Section 11 of the act expressly repealed Title 26, L. O. L. *Held*, that as the caption of the act of 1913 did not mention the repeal of any existing laws, and did not suggest any attempt to repeal any law or curtail the established privileges of any city or town, the attempted repeal of Title 26, L. O. L., was ineffective, save in so far as a change in procedure for incorporation of municipalities might work an implied repeal, and hence Sections 3211, 3229, giving privileges to municipalities, which were part of Title 26, were not repealed.

[As to the sufficiency of the title of a statute, see note in 64 Am. St. Rep. 70.]

PG 2 + 4

Shenards show no over-rule

Municipal Corporations—Authority of Municipality—Charter.

2. The powers of a municipality are not necessarily restricted to those expressed in its charter, and a municipality may rely on the general statutes applicable to all municipalities enacted prior to the grant of its charter.

Municipal Corporations—Charter—Constitutional Provisions.

3. Those constitutional provisions (Article XI, Section 2) adopted June 4, 1896, forbidding the legislature to enact, amend or repeal any charter or act of incorporation for any municipality or town, do not apply to a municipal corporation already chartered, and which under existing laws was entitled to exercise enumerated privileges.

Damages.—Municipal Corporations—Lighting Plants—Bonds—Recovery.

4. A municipal corporation authorized by Sections 3211, 3229, L. O. L., to sue and be sued, contract and be contracted with, acquire, hold, possess, dispose of property, and to provide for the lighting of streets, and furnishing the city or town and the inhabitants thereof with gas or other lights as well as to allow the use of streets and alleys of the city to any person or corporation who may desire to establish works for supplying the city and its inhabitants with water or lights, upon such reasonable terms as the council may prescribe, granted defendant corporation a franchise to erect poles and string wires in the streets of the town, the ordinance requiring defendant to give a bond conditioned that it should have a certain portion of its service in full operation within nine months after the grant of the franchise and should maintain it so as to furnish electricity adequate for light and power purposes. Defendant accepted the terms of the grant and accepted and executed its bond, but failed to erect poles or in any way to comply with the requirement that it should have a certain percentage of its service in full operation within nine months. *Held*, that the municipality might without proof of any special or actual damages recover the full amount of the undertaking.

From Josephine: FRANK M. CALKINS, Judge.

Department 1. Statement by Mr. JUSTICE BURNETT.

By an ordinance adopted by its legal voters the City of Grants Pass granted a franchise to the defendant Rogue River Public Service Corporation to plant poles, string wires and do other things necessary for the establishment of an electric plant in that town. The ordinance required that the grantee give a bond to the municipality in the sum of \$1,000 conditioned substantially that it should have a certain portion of its service in full operation within nine months after the date of the enactment and afterwards should maintain

it so as to furnish electricity adequate for light and power purposes. The defendant accepted the terms of the grant and executed its bond as required, with the American Surety Company of New York as its surety. Nothing, however, was done by the defendant under the franchise at any time. After the lapse of the nine months' period specified in the bond the city by an ordinance also adopted by the people declared a forfeiture of the undertaking and afterwards brought this action to recover the amount named. Each of the defendants filed a general demurrer to the complaint which being overruled they refused to plead further and judgment followed for the face of the bond and costs. They have appealed. **AFFIRMED.**

For appellants there was a brief over the names of Mr. F. C. Howell and Mr. O. S. Blanchard, with an oral argument by Mr. Howell.

For respondent there was a brief and an oral argument by Mr. H. D. Norton.

Mr. Justice BURNETT delivered the opinion of the court.

1. The plaintiff city operates under a charter enacted by the legislative assembly of the state in the form of an act approved February 16, 1901. In the present juncture it relies for sanction of its action not only upon that enactment, but also upon the general statute of 1893 embodied in Title XXVI, L. O. L., Chapters 1-5 inclusive. Section 3211, L. O. L., reads thus:

"Municipal corporations now existing in this state, or hereafter organized therein under this act, shall be bodies politic and corporate, under the name of the city or town, as the case may be, of —, and as such may sue and be sued, contract and be contracted with, acquire, hold, possess, dispose of property subject to the re-

Not Chartered
1901
Newly Incorporated

strictions contained in this act or other laws of this state, have a common seal, and change or alter same at pleasure, and exercise such other powers and have such other privileges as are now conferred by law, or by this act, or which may hereafter be conferred by laws duly enacted by the legislative assembly of this state, and shall have perpetual succession."

It is said also in Section 3229, L. O. L.:

"The mayor and aldermen shall compose the common council of any such city or town organized under this act, and at any regular meeting thereof shall have power to provide for lighting the streets, and furnishing such city or town and inhabitants thereof with gas or other lights, and with pure and wholesome water; and for such purposes may construct such water, gas or other works, within or without the city limits as may be necessary or convenient therefor, and may allow the use of the streets and alleys of the city to any person, company, or corporation who may desire to establish works for supplying the city and inhabitants thereof with such water or lights upon such reasonable terms and conditions as the council may prescribe."

By the terms of the legislation of 1893, noted above, the privileges accorded by the latter section inured not only to municipalities created under the act itself, but also to all others of the kind then existing. We are not unmindful of the act of February 28, 1913, Laws of 1913, p. 689, the title of which reads thus:

"An Act to provide for the organization and incorporation of cities and towns and to legalize such corporations as heretofore have attempted to be incorporated under Chapter I of Title XXVI of Lord's Oregon Laws, and are now exercising the functions of incorporated cities and towns under such attempted incorporation."

Section 11 thereof declares:

"Chapter 1 of Title XXVI of Lord's Oregon Laws and all acts and parts of acts in conflict therewith are hereby repealed."

We here set down Article IV, Section 20, of the Constitution of the state:

"Every act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be embraced in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title."

In the title of the act in question there is no hint whatever of any intention to repeal any law or to curtail the established privileges of any city or town. The right to contract and to prescribe the terms thereof was vested by that statute in all municipal corporations and no one reading the title in question could divine that the legislative body intended to cancel those rights. The principal features of the law appearing in the body thereof relate to the manner in which the creation of a new city or town may be initiated; and, so far as it actually and necessarily supersedes the former procedure, it would probably amount to a repeal by implication; but only so because we are advised by the title of the probable scope of the act, and not, however, of any proposed avulsion of long-settled rights. We hold, therefore, that as against the grant of the privileges mentioned the repealing words in Section 11 are void under the constitutional provision already noted because the subject of such repeal is not named in the title.

2. The defendants urge that the act of 1893 is not available to the plaintiff corporation, that it can operate solely by its charter, and that unless in this latter instrument it has express authority to exact a bond the attempt to do so is void and creates no liability upon the defendants although they disregarded the covenant thereof. It is true that by the strict letter of some

utterances of the court in cases heretofore under consideration color is given to such a contention for it is often said that a corporation is bound by its charter and cannot exceed the terms thereof. Without exception, however, in those cases a charter was confessedly the only source of corporate power then under judicial consideration. In our judgment it is not necessary that all the authority of any municipality shall be found in some one enactment of the legislative department of the state. That branch of the government is not restricted within such narrow terms as to require it to express all its will upon any subject in a single statute.

3. Neither is the question before us within the scope or prohibition of the later constitutional provisions forbidding the legislative assembly to enact, amend or repeal any charter or act of incorporation for any municipality, city or town. This constitutional measure was not adopted until June 4, 1906, while the privilege conferred by the actual charter of Grants Pass and by the act of 1893 were all promulgated long before. At that time at least it was not necessary that such a subject be treated as if the state should tender to a municipality a certain privilege which the latter could accept or reject as if it were a high contracting party. Then municipalities of the kind were under the sole control of the legislative department. The latter could award or withhold privileges, and without further ado the town could operate under the franchises thus conferred.

4. The resulting legislative situation is substantially like that portrayed in and governed by the case of the *City of Salem v. Anson*, 40 Or. 339 (67 Pac. 190, 91 Am. St. Rep. 485, 56 L. R. A. 169). In that instance Anson had procured a franchise from the city allow-

ing him the use of the streets and alleys for the purpose of establishing an electric light plant. The town exacted from him a bond almost precisely like the one in question in its general provisions. This court sustained the city in recovering the full amount of the undertaking, without being compelled to show that it had suffered any special or actual damages whatever. That case rules the present one. On its authority we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.

AFFIRMED.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE McBRIDE, MR. JUSTICE BENSON and MR. JUSTICE HARRIS concur.

Argued February 14, affirmed March 5, 1918.

IN RE GRANTS PASS IRR. DIST.

(000 Pac. 000.)

Waters and Watercourses—Irrigation Districts—Organization—Bond Issue—Approval of Court—Statutes.

1. Under Title XII, Chapter VII, L. O. L., as amended by legislative acts, providing for the organization of irrigation districts, the issuing and sale of bonds of said district, and by authority of Chapter 337, page 773, Section 41, Laws 1917, allowing special proceedings in the Circuit Court of the county in which the office of such district is located, for the purpose of having a judicial examination and judgment of the court as to the regularity and legality of the proceedings of the board of directors of said district providing for and authorizing the issue and sale of bonds of said district, record examined and held, that the organization and existence of said irrigation district and the validity of the bonds it proposes to issue are regular in all respects and is therefore approved.

From Josephine: FRANK M. CALKINS, Judge.

Proceedings instituted by the directors of the Grants Pass Irrigation District to obtain from the court an order declaring valid and legal all the steps leading up to the organization of the district and the election

-404- d252Or²²⁷ d252Or¹²²²⁸ j253Or⁶⁴²⁶ 51OrA¹⁵³⁷⁷ 57OLR517 -429- 1OrA¹⁵²⁹¹ 2OrA¹²⁵⁰¹ -528- d259Or¹⁵¹³⁷ 261Or⁴²⁰⁴ 268Or⁴³⁵⁵ 268Or¹⁵³⁵⁵ 269Or²³¹ 37A³²⁰⁷ⁿ 80A³¹⁶³ⁿ 80A³¹⁹⁶ⁿ 80A³²⁰²ⁿ -571- 272Or³¹⁸⁰ -576- 259Or¹²⁴ -625- 280Or⁴⁴⁰⁸ 45OrA⁹⁷⁵ -662- 269Or⁵⁵⁴ -672- d284Or⁵⁷³⁷ d286Or⁵⁷⁹⁷ d286Or⁶⁸⁰² 43OrA⁶⁴⁸ 64NwL456	-205- 262Or¹⁹³⁵³ e286Or⁵⁷⁹⁵ f286Or⁴⁸⁰² c286Or¹⁸⁸⁰⁶ -224- 281Or¹²⁵⁰⁵ 60OrA¹⁵¹²⁵ -270- 261Or¹⁴⁸³ -284- 276Or⁵³⁶⁵ -307- 98A³³⁷⁰ⁿ 98A³⁴¹³ⁿ -310- 48OrA¹⁸⁰⁶ -323- 271Or⁹⁶⁵⁰ -328- 291Or²³⁷ e291Or⁵²³⁹ 573F2d¹¹³² 38AG1349 38AG1398 40AG37 -356- 17OrA⁴⁶²⁶ 17OrA³⁶²⁸ 43OrA⁴⁸⁸⁵ 51OrA⁴⁶⁷² -371- 271Or¹⁵¹² -375- h255Or³²⁴³ h255Or⁴²⁴³ 272Or¹²⁷⁴ -399- 432F2d¹⁵⁶⁶ -431- 252Or¹⁵⁷⁶ 39AG733 42AG260 57OLR534 -442- 20OrA⁵²⁴⁰ 29OrA³⁷⁷⁰ 13WML433 -450- d281Or²⁰⁷ 40AG428 -483- 39OrA²⁸⁷¹ -488- 255Or¹⁰²²¹ 273Or²⁹⁰⁹ -513- 36AG538	-524- 251Or⁹⁴⁴⁵ 25OrA⁷⁶⁹ -551- j275Or¹²⁶⁸ -557- 252Or¹⁰⁵⁹⁵ 31A³¹²⁹⁸ⁿ -567- 264Or⁵¹⁷⁰ 266Or³⁵⁵⁶ -588- 272Or²²⁹⁴ 272Or³²⁹⁴ -601- 47OrA¹⁸⁴⁶ -632- 71A³¹¹⁸⁷ⁿ 73A^{3995.1} -666- 290Or²⁵⁸ 35AG249 Vol. 85 -1- 274Or⁶²⁸³ 4A³⁵⁴¹ⁿ -14- 272Or³⁵⁶ -37- 293Or¹¹⁶⁸ 87R463 -49- 262Or⁶⁶²⁴ 262Or⁷⁶²⁶ 276Or⁴³⁵ j276Or⁷⁴⁴² 277Or⁶³⁵³ 281Or⁴²⁴⁸ 284Or⁷²⁸⁹ -61- 264Or⁴²⁰⁵ j264Or⁵²⁰⁸ -86- 262Or¹⁴⁸¹ -91- 274Or¹³¹¹ 52OrA¹⁸⁵⁶ -99- 22OrA¹²⁵¹ -113- 254Or³³⁹⁹ -172- j60OrA³⁰⁸ -188- 53OrA¹⁴⁸	-199- 4OrA³¹⁵ -224- 50OLR680 -251- 41OrA¹¹³¹ -265- 262Or³⁴⁴⁶ 18OrA⁴⁵⁷⁴ 79CR20 43A³³⁰⁹ⁿ -276- d10OrA⁶³³ -287- 55OrA¹⁹⁸⁵ q55OrA¹⁹⁸⁵ -333- f254Or²³⁰⁵ -345- 288Or⁷¹⁶ -359- 253Or⁹⁷ -434- 261Or³⁷⁵ 9WML245 -444- f263Or⁵⁶⁸ d269Or³⁰⁵ 15WML206 -485- d255Or¹⁶⁴¹¹ 29OrA¹⁸¹⁶⁵ 6TR261 34AG840 37AG814 38AG1820 40AG119 57OLR534 -548- 46A³⁸¹²ⁿ 46A³⁸⁶⁰ⁿ -574- 254Or⁴⁵⁹² 254Or⁵⁵⁹² 254Or⁶⁵⁹² 259Or⁶⁵¹⁹ 16OrA⁶²⁸² -586- 28OrA⁴⁶⁸⁷ -597- 37A³¹⁴²⁹ⁿ -652- h264Or⁴³¹⁹ -657- 35AG850 4EnL329	Vol. 86 -1- 279Or¹⁵⁵⁵³ 23OrA¹⁵⁶⁶² 41OrA²³⁰ -62- 51CaL858 -78- 24OrA²⁸²⁵ -99- 273Or⁷⁴³⁴ j273Or⁷⁴³⁸ 274Or⁷¹¹² -121- 261Or⁹² 53MnL6 -140- 39A³⁹²⁷ⁿ 39A³⁹⁶⁶ⁿ -165- 271Or²⁶³ 62McL75 -174- d56OrA³⁶¹⁸ -224- 257Or⁴⁸ 275Or⁶³⁸ -250- e266Or⁵³⁵⁰ -303- 45OrA⁷⁵⁵¹ 55OrA⁷⁴⁴⁰ -311- e255Or⁸¹¹ 256Or⁶⁴⁹⁶ 35AG546 -366- 291Or³¹⁶² 35AG4 50OLR302 -379- 51OLR481 47MnL90 -390- f19OrA²⁷⁷³ j24OrA²²³¹ 24OrA²⁵⁷⁷ 24OrA²⁵⁹⁰ 61OLR9 -411- 251Or³⁶¹¹ 262Or²²³ 262Or¹³²⁴	-427- d58OrA¹²⁹ -464- 278Or⁵⁵⁰⁴ 9OrA¹²⁸⁵ 17OrA⁵⁴⁷ -474- 38A³⁶⁹²ⁿ -508- 37AG684 -554- 263Or³²⁸² 14OrA²⁵⁵⁰ 56OrA³⁶⁷⁷ 56OrA³⁶⁹⁰ 55TxL788 -590- f254Or²⁴⁰⁸ -617- 50OLR332 -648- q55OrA¹⁴⁹⁵ -670- d274Or³⁴²⁶ 93A³⁵³⁰ⁿ -683- 5A³³²⁴ⁿ -695- 280Or⁶⁴⁸ -704- 280Or¹⁴⁸ Vol. 87 -21- 35AG308 -65- 56OLR579 -78- 290Or²⁴⁶ -105- 10OrA¹²⁹² -112- 265Or⁷⁵¹¹ -132- 254Or³¹⁴⁸ -148- 10WML374 -163- 257Or⁵³⁹ 257Or⁶³⁹ -179- 284Or⁸⁹⁹	-198- 254Or³¹⁴⁷ 255Or¹¹¹⁹ -215- 271Or¹¹¹² q60OrA⁵⁷ -239- 3OrA¹⁴ -271- 259Or¹⁶¹⁷ d277Or¹¹⁵ -277- 269Or⁷⁵⁹⁵ 271Or¹²⁷⁰⁵ 56OrA⁷⁵⁹⁰ -314- 256Or³⁶¹ -435- 34AG908 -452- 261Or³⁷⁵ -467- 282Or⁶¹⁰³ -476- 256Or⁴⁶²⁶ j261Or⁴¹⁹ j269Or¹⁰² 272Or¹³⁸ 12OrA⁴³⁶³ j42OrA⁷⁹⁸ -517- 30A³⁹⁴³ⁿ 30A³⁹⁵⁴ⁿ -560- 252Or²⁴⁶⁷ 274Or⁷⁸⁰⁶ -576- 262Or¹⁶²⁵ 262Or⁷⁶²⁶ 276Or⁷⁴³⁵ 277Or⁶³⁵³ 281Or⁷²⁴⁸ 13OrA³⁸² 430FS⁶¹⁰⁶ 47CLQ506 -614- 288Or⁷¹⁶ -624- 42OrA⁴⁵⁸ -637- 262Or⁴⁶²⁶ 8OrA²⁵⁵⁸ -657- 36AG822 -665- 255Or⁴¹⁴⁹ d257Or⁴⁶¹⁴ 280Or³⁴⁸	-683- 263Or²⁷⁹ Vol. 88 -84- 254Or⁷³⁸⁸ 267Or²⁴²⁹ -144- 286Or²⁵³ 32OrA²³¹⁴ -150- 268Or³³³⁵ -158- q294Or³¹⁹⁹ -164- 291Or²¹¹² -176- 263Or³⁴¹ -209- 52OrA³⁷⁷⁵ -219- 84A³⁴⁶⁶ⁿ -228- e18OrA²⁴¹⁸ -247- j265Or³⁶⁴ -310- 37A³⁷⁸⁶ⁿ -346- q10OrA²²⁷⁶ -350- 45OrA²⁴⁵⁵³ -376- 19OrA⁶²⁰³ 50OrA¹¹²⁴ 38AG1052 50OLR679 -403- 278Or¹¹³³ -430- 87HLR1439 -443- 61OLR37 -465- 260Or³¹²⁹ 260Or¹¹³³ 51CLQ444 -490- 276Or¹⁹³ -554- d254Or⁵¹⁷⁸ 262Or⁴³⁸ 276Or⁸⁹⁹⁸ 21OrA⁷⁴¹⁵
--	---	---	--	--	--	---	---